

Dr. Darren C. Marks
“Overcoming the New Gnosticism: Re-founding Theological Anthropology”

Abstract

Over the course of modernity embodiment has become a major theme of theology and as such has introduced a theological anthropology that is at variance with its origin in Christology or Christ as the pneumatic human. As a result of this morphing of theological anthropology, sexuality, as echoed in the work of Foucault, has become a dominant dialogue partner in identity let alone theological anthropology by assuming nature as antithetical to spirit. This, I argue, introduces a host of issues that are centripetal to the hope of dialogue with a Christian culture in the Global South that has not undergone this morphing of [sexuality] identity and embodiment. Instead, a re-founding of theological anthropology in Christology, and specifically in the concept that God only knows the human person as sinner (Bonhoeffer), might provide a way forward that proves acceptable to both Western and Global minds, or at least provide a place from which a theological anthropology can initiate a dialogue. Finally, and tethering to the *St Michael Report*, I suggest that just such a theological assumption resolves the centripetal forces in the document’s conclusions and mixed message on the nature of *adiaphora* and core doctrine.

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Overcoming the New Gnosticism: Re-founding Theological Anthropology

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‘It is through sex – in fact, an *imaginary* point determined by the *deployment of sexuality* – that [in modernity] each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility, [as sex] is both the hidden aspect and the generative principle of meaning, to the whole of one’s body . . . to one’s identity . . .’¹

I wish to raise a provocative point today in terms of theological anthropology and in doing so marshal an unexpected, for some, voice in Michael Foucault in order to argue my thesis. My thesis is simple: In the modern West, and by implication in the Global South and its post-colonial response to the modern West, sexuality has become a dominant way of expressing human identity or in more classical terms a way of doing the job of anthropology; and, in Christian theological terms, doing the job of *theological anthropology*. But as important as this new Gnosticism (a term I will defend in a

moment) is for human identity, as articulated by Foucault, sexual identity is not only a merely form of immanence or self-rule,² but sexuality is also in the modern period a form of power politics. In fact, sexual identity, as Foucault cogently argues, in modernity is about not merely a chimera of identity or human fulfillment in manner that any classical or Christian theological tradition might also argue, but also has been married to an ideology of capitalism and materialism inherited from our long sixteenth century. As such, since both the Christian West and Global South have, as articulated in the sociological work of Immanuel Wallenstein, a common heritage or world culture – interaction and reaction – with capitalism,³ it follows that perhaps power derived by materialist means actually determines the context of much of our discussion on sexuality simply because I think Foucault is right: sexuality is about power (or biopower as he calls it). But this is even more dangerous for theology for that which what was once the realm of God, or at least the job of God as the agent of transformation and guarantor of human uniqueness, is now given to the human person and in particular human sexual identity. But that promise of freedom is secretly itself under another master in the marketplace. In short, sexuality is our anthropology but one which really reveals our basic commitment to a power network that is intrinsically hostile to God as it presumes to do the job of God but really is Mammon.⁴ Both Modern West and Global South then argue for a anthropology on behalf of Mammon masquerading as God. We have, as Foucault notes himself, in sexuality or discourse about sexuality an echo of ‘ . . . the ancient form of preaching. A great sexual sermon which has [its] subtle theologians and its popular voices’⁵ This is a new theology.

So how is this then the new Gnosticism? Many might object that it is not strictly speaking Gnosticism for Gnosticism, strictly speaking, is a system that largely gives precedence to the spiritual over the body so that embodiment is accidental and a stage to move through in order to achieve the immaterial. However, Gnosticism is actually a pre-occupation with the body, and in particular sexuality, in order to yield ‘the secret’ of human existence and the candidates to witness to this include the Valentinians and Carpocratians. Despite recently scholarly attempts to constrain the category⁶, it seems clear to me at least that Gnosticism understands the body as something to be constrained, broken or wrestled with in order to yield a greater secret. The body is something not only to be mastered but is in that mastery, the key to Spirit. The body, as say in the Christian tradition of Aquinas, as united the soul, is not the proper form of humanity⁷ so that the totality of human existence including materiality is part of God’s will for human creation. In the Gnosticism tradition, the body becomes a cipher whose testing, in the words of Foucault, becomes our ‘revelation’ as we interact with our bodies which help us decipher the sign or secret of our true ‘obscure truth’.⁸ It is not merely that ‘matter matters’ but rather that the discourse or talk of sex meant for us moderns, as in the Gnostics in part, a discourse on ‘the problem of truth’ which harbours ‘a fundamental truth’.⁹ With the advent of the science of sex (*scientia sexualis*) and its twin esotericism as *magia sexualis*, and the great proponents P B Randolph, Alister Crowley and Pierre Bernard,¹⁰ western humanity becomes a confessing, namely interested in its own taboos, animal and its literature orders itself ‘to the infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of confession holds hold like a

shimmering mirage'.¹¹ If that doesn't sound like Gnosticism, then I am not sure what would?

Thus far I have argued that sexuality or rather sexual identity in which act [genital use] becomes foundational to who a person *is*, so that the body's actions become *the mode of specification of individuals* is a modern preoccupation¹² and call Foucault to witness. Further, I added that this is a reversal of the Christian understanding of truth and identity which assumes the body and soul are orientated to God and that one privileged over the other becomes problematic and therefore I will argue for a different kind of anthropology. This, later I will argue, is Christology in which Christ is the pneumatic human and therefore the only theological anthropology allowed. Finally, I intimated that, again following Foucault, that what we are really talking about in sexuality is power and a common understanding of power. This point remains to be explicated.

However, before moving off in that direction, a little detour needs to be taken which is to clarify how sexuality as understood by Foucault is different than theologies of embodiment, as they are often confused. Embodiment is a theme in European phenomenology, and in particular in the interpretations of Edmund Husserl, J P Sartre and to a lesser degree Martin Heidegger by Maurice Merleau-Ponty.¹³ What Merleau-Ponty argued, in a nutshell, is that our bodies in interaction with other bodies and itself constitute a means of analysis that overcomes the Cartesian anxiety of the modern world in which thought is privileged over a dubious body or perception. Our bodies are integral to our knowing selves. Theologians following the work of Jewish philosopher/theologian Emmanuel Lévinas¹⁴ and political philosophers such as Canada's own William Kymlicka¹⁵ have picked up a theme in embodiment in the idea that we only 'know' through a mediated body in interaction with others in the idea of alterity. Alterity means 'otherness' and assumes that by encounter with another, which can be constituted only by love and not power as in traditional metaphysics (in which my objective self forces reality or conformity of the other), we learn of ourselves more completely.

Naturally it seems logical to think, as Levinas himself noted¹⁶ and picked up by process and postmodern theologians that this is indeed the face of Christ – the incarnation - as God's willingness to be molded by another. Embodiment thus becomes a two-pronged fork. In some cases, it is a merely preontological demand for friendship and inclusion or at least representation at all costs; while in the Christian context it becomes, in a strange morphing, largely the Church as a place of enacted friendship (or cultivated self awareness with others) modeled after the friendship of God with the 'Other'. The Church, as in the work of Stanley Hauerwas who recently (and errantly) decried Bonhoeffer as the origin of his thought,¹⁷ becomes, really, the enactment of God in its operation of the confessing and forgiveness of sin. Besides not realizing that Bonhoeffer leaves his earliest work, *Sanctorum Communio*, or rather corrects it, Hauerwas' ecclesio-Christology reads as a virtue ethic in that the Church *is* a certain ethic (namely pacifism and a forgiving community) not that the Church has a certain ethic because of the operation of grace therein despite human folly and thereby ascribes to the Church attributes - 'is' - that properly only belong to God. Why this becomes problematic, aside from questions on the nature of sin and grace, is simple: is this any Christian

community you know of? Consider this, if the Church *is* something, then how problematic is it that it doesn't embody all virtues fully, but perhaps imperfectly? While for almost all postmodern theologians such as Graham Ward and Hauerwas, the model Christian Church par excellence is Quakerism, but the stress on ecclesio-Christological reenactment leads, at least to me, to a staunchly Catholic model – perhaps explaining the recusant and open Catholicism of the radical Orthodox movement.

The reason I offer this excursus on embodiment is to highlight a simple point. Embodiment and sexuality are often mixed in a heady cocktail in the homosexual and same-sex debates so that alterity becomes a motif of inclusion, derived from a Christology that assumes in the incarnation God assumes 'otherness', and one proceeds merrily along as in our own *St Michael's Report* that the Church has a prophetic function to include the other. But, the ideas *are* different. The question is 'how'?

The 'how' is important and pivots on two separate axis. In Foucault's understanding of sexuality and sexual discourse and identity what we have is a case in which a Christian tradition mis-step created a false god that replaced the traditional Lord¹⁸ and creates, by definition, an Anti-Church mentality because, in truth, by virtue of its discourse new and creative an-archy can teach the Church about the nature of truth.¹⁹ It is the secular bar none that is all important to teach the Church (and God). In the case of embodiment, at least best represented in the vision of *eros* theology by Gerald Loughlin and Graham Ward following Hans Urs von Balthasar, it is rooted in a theological account of the Trinity as enacted in creative echo so that sexuality is not about act or even body per say, but rather a cipher of the 'person-al' so that giving and receiving is gift and a mode of perichoretic union.²⁰ What is picked up is the notion of *ekstasis*; that is, the risky venture by God to us and us to God, the merging of *agape* and our *eros* so that we have rapture with and in God as our delight before the winsome beauty of God that is founded in Christ and to which our true selves resonate. This, more often than not, is found in any expression of human love, not just the masculine-feminine or same-sex but also mother-child/parent-child, developmentally challenged and mainstream society, poor and rich and so forth. In almost all cases, it is imperative to move the conversation from sexuality as dictated by genital actions or biology/gender to a conversation about the 'riddle of humanity' which is a dialectic between God and flesh, human and human as given in the male-female dialectic in von Balthasar and individuals and community.²¹ Church, then, as the clearest place of revelation has something to say to the secular.

What we really have is not sex then but rather suprasexualities or ways of expressing the more fundamental reality of giving and receiving love, the Trinitarian outgoing of *agape* and its confluence in *eros*. While it may be as in the case of both von Balthasar and Barth, that masculinity is giving and femininity is receiving, there is another more important point I wish to draw: the inclusion of 'supra' becomes in itself a reason for the analogy's failure as it, as 'above', reinforces the *difference* between the divine *ekstasis* of the Trinity and humans/creation made in that image. While some may try to reinterpret donation, reception and return more radically and as a critique of homosociality in order to found difference so that Mary, as an example, had not merely a womb but also a uterus and a clitoris too,²² it remains problematic whether just such a theology, as in the

criticism of Luce Irigaray's oft critiqued and defended essentialism, escapes Foucault's supposition that we ultimately fail to talk about anything else but our power albeit determined by biology. But this then takes me to my next point: sexuality as power.

This point is not really all that innovative, after all in the influential and regarded work, *Theology and Social Theory*, John Milbank makes just such a case that secular reason created a so-called new ontology – humans as cultured being - which also in another manner coincided with discovery of the construction of human culture. The promise, never delivered, of a new autonomous and egalitarian human identity was riddled with wormholes from the start. The double theme, human construction of culture and culturally constructed humans, he argues is really an anti-theology and leads in his opinion to a nihilism, both culturally and politically, making Nietzsche the poster child of modernity. More importantly for theology, this double theme lead to a 'mystical monism'²³ in which difference, despite a hope of toleration, is actually continuous 'auto-differentiation, as unitive selfhood – identity – is never a possibility and thus must 'will to power' itself leading to a necessity of a real ontology of violence. In short, in the chaos of nihilism, we make, and this is violent, the hope of a 'perpetual peace' recedes as difference is reduced to self-identities in power nexus. Milbank alerts us to what Foucault is going to help us with in terms of sexuality and identity: it is both a false theology in which idolatry is committed, as worship of the immanent self, in order to falsely posit an ultimate cosmological or theological connection but more importantly it is really, essentially power – a new form of ontotheological abuse this time sanctioned by secular reason.

Foucault's work is helpful in one sense for our purposes today. He is very clear that our modern preoccupation with sexuality identity comes about due to economic activities or market forces and as such is a contingent human power masquerading as ultimate truth.²⁴ His argument is as follows: the shift in the nineteenth century to an industrialized economic system²⁵ enhanced a dormant confessionism deep within Christian Europe that required sexuality to be 'policed' in order to serve its economic master of production. People, or rather population, were commodities and the more plentiful in terms of production and consumption, so much the better. Sex, then, becomes a function of the economic environment, to be administered or controlled,²⁶ in order to maximize the yield of the industrial machine. It becomes 'public', 'managed' and analyzed.²⁷ But more importantly, it becomes 'talked about' so that how one uses one's sexuality becomes important and the 'repressive hypothesis' begins its enchantment. Foucault's understanding picks up on not the paucity of sexual discourse but its ubiquity in the Victorian era and past century in which sexuality was reified, politicized, medicalized as technique, and finally psycho-analyzed moving from the concrete to the increasingly theoretical and symbolic whose taming will yield a 'secret'.²⁸ In order to tame sexuality, it must be explored in all its possible variations, categorized and phenomenologized as the 'other' even in the self. In the words of Foucault, or preoccupation with talking about sexuality, pushing boundaries of discovery, resulted in 'the body as a mode of specification of individuals' or rather what one did with one's body, and specifically genitals, became co-extensive with one's complete identity.²⁹ Sexuality, then, becomes an ontology. But it is an ontology borne out of human construction and 'a correlate of exact

procedures of power'.³⁰ Sexual identity is not an ahistorical (or even therefore redemptive) experience, but a historical experience constructed³¹ and therefore as Foucault later wishes to argue but a part of a greater sum of human existence.

So what does Foucault's hypothesis mean for us today in terms of dealing with theological anthropology? Well, clearly the first and most important aspect is that the 'new Gnosticism' as I have called it is a rival to 'theo-logical' anthropology. But almost as important is the realization that much of our discussions on sexuality within anthropology, even amongst conservative voices, is tacitly in agreement with the biopower thesis of Foucault. Let me give two examples of what I mean. In terms of 'liberal' attitudes it is clear that I am articulating a position that calls for a different understanding, and I shall posit one shortly, for theological anthropology which eschews the presupposition that our sexual identities, both hetero and homosexual, form an anthropology but that once we embark on just such a theological decision, we are enmeshed by a network of biopower that claims much in terms of tolerance and difference but which in fact delivers nothing to that end of substantial worth. Ultimately, it leads to a philosophical nihilism and a political witch-hunt or demonization. For the conservative, I am also arguing that perhaps in part much of the global South's rejection of sexuality as identity is not also due to a theological anthropology or even reading of the biblical texts but instead a parasitic relationship and even 'functional repressive hypothesis' in terms of colonialism and Western market forces. The global south distrust of secularization – read largely as a mistrust of market and governments, Western and local, for good reason I might add – may in fact lead the global South into the network of biopower in which the 'repressive hypothesis' functions in exactly the way Foucault suggests. It leads to an anthropology that is preoccupied, externally with heterosexuality and marriage, but internally it creates a supposition that what constitutes as human identity is sexual activity and the body, not embodiment, as the dominant aspect of human spirituality.

God in both cases, Global South and Liberal West, is a cipher for a protracted economic, historical and godless network of powers. Both Global South and Liberal West now assume that what is foundational as a holistic feature of identity is what one does with one's sexuality³² and the battle rages as a battle for power, both skills for production/consumption and claiming a theological rationale which is in reality an idol. No wonder the conversation seems constipated, both enchanted by the promise that sexuality yields Spirit but instead serving Mammon, promoting unity but sowing discord. Is there then a way forward?

A New (Old) Theological Anthropology

'Christ belongs both to the wicked and the good; He belongs to them both only as sinners, that is to say, as people who in their wickedness and in their goodness have fallen away from the origin. He *summons* them back to the origin so that they shall not longer be good and evil but justified and sanctified sinners.'³³

What I now propose is a new (old) anthropology gleaned from the writing of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in which the locus of theological anthropology is found in Christ and specifically in the notion of the human person as sinner but nonetheless made whole by God's sanctification and summoning or 'vocation' to use a term now out of fashion. Bonhoeffer's ethical theory, our commitment to responsibility to difference, falls squarely on the notion that freedom, and therefore true identity, is only found in responsibility or conformation of what is declared and enabled by God's grace in, through and under Christ. Bonhoeffer is clear that this is not an idealized person (say as in the charge of James Cone)³⁴ but humanity as humanity really is – namely constituted by its essential and irreducible relationship to God in Christ and therefore to 'reality' as it really is as constituted by submission to the vocation of God.³⁵ In short, when we 'ecce homo' we see ourselves and the world correctly for the first time because in that moment, sustained by God's gracious to us, we are free in our vocations as people of God to 'help our neighbor [and creation itself] to [likewise] be a person before God'.³⁶ It follows from Bonhoeffer's thought that the real human, and real foundation of reality itself, is Christ: for in Christ 'there is a place at which God and cosmic reality are reconciled, a place at which God and human have become one'.³⁷

Now foundational to this idea is a largely repugnant idea for moderns: that only as sinner is humanity constituted. However, and before moving to explore this idea more deeply, we must be careful to realize that this is not a moral category for Bonhoeffer – a description of a Kantian universal moral imperative or worth, soundness or reasonableness but rather an affirmation of the action of God in which what humans offer towards God is judged, renewed and annexed into the divine. There is a motif of the *theologia crucis* operative here: that in the sentence/judgement of God on the human sinner one finds instead the nature of the crucified God or a willingness, in the parlance of modern theological themes, to embrace the other despite, in spite and without human folly whether personal moral or systemic ideologies to foster *that* person as the person of God. It then is the *fate* of sinful humanity and created reality to be taken up by God, to be executed on the cross in order to find its truest nature which is concord with God as revealed in the God-man. It is not sinner as pariah, nor righteous as beloved, that determines human worth but rather our 'acceptance of the sentence passed . . . by Divine love'.³⁸ This is the glorious 'yes' of grace in which Christians, by the actions of the Church as a community conformed and confirmed in that reality, learn to unlearn what the world teaches and instead is called or summoned to something else. It is this notion, of summons, call or conformation that I wish to address.

First, we must note that summons, call or conformation is not a call of morality per se but instead a call to what Bonhoeffer calls 'responsibility'. What is the 'responsible human' – a sinner, one who knows the need and effect of grace, who realizes that only Christ is the form of humanity and therefore takes seriously the call of God to foster *that* love of God and for God in another:

Every day a [Christian] person dies the death of a sinner. He humbly bears the scars of his body and soul, the marks of the wounds which sin inflicts on him. He cannot raise himself up above any other man or set himself before another as a

model, for he knows himself to be the greatest of all sinners. He can excuse the sin of another, but never his own He does not attach importance to distinguishing himself but only to distinguishing [witnessing] Christ for the sake of others'.³⁹

But is this not an abstract concept, capable of being reduced to a principle of inclusion, Christological imperative or ecclesial virtue as in Hauerwas?

Were Bonhoeffer to end on this note, then I think the answer would be yes. But he adds more to his Christological suppositions. To distinguish from 'how can I be good' to 'what is the will of God' is a theological point. Vocation is, for Bonhoeffer, the problem of realization among God's creatures of the revelational reality of God in Christ or in another sense the question of the 'good' is really a question of *participation* in the divine reality which is Christ.⁴⁰ Vocation is not a correspondence to an 'order of reality or mandate'⁴¹ or another entity we designate as reality but it is the call of God alone to *this* sinner so that *this* sinner encounters God-in-the-world or the reality of the world as already sustained, accepted and reconciled.⁴² Vocation is theological existence and this Bonhoeffer notes is a 'proving' the will of God (Rom 12:2).

Proving the will of God is knowledge of Jesus Christ and for Bonhoeffer it is living in response to new questions and issues – the problem of sinful people and sin-vitiated creation – each day. It is a humble and trustworthy exercise that presupposes *unity* with its origin and expects to find unity because of the simplicity of the ever one word of God:

Possibilities and consequences must be carefully assessed. In other words the whole apparatus of human powers must be set in motion when it is a matter of proving what is the will of God. But in all this there will be no room for the torment of being confronted with insoluble conflicts, or for the arrogant notions that one can master every conflict, or even for the enthusiastic expectation and assertion of direct inspiration. There *will* be belief that if a person *asks* [note prayer and worship] humbly God will give certain knowledge of God's will . . . and then freedom to make a real decision⁴³

But underscoring this is the recognition of ourselves as sinners and subsequently the knowledge that 'Jesus Christ is in us' for it is foundational that Jesus Christ lives for us and in us, and that Jesus Christ occupies within us the same space previously occupied by idols of our own making in the knowledge of good and evil and God's will: 'Christian self-proving is possible only on the basis of foreknowledge that Jesus Christ is within us'.⁴⁴ This means, for Bonhoeffer, to love as a *response* of divine call by the sinner as 'love is always the revelation of God in Christ Jesus'.⁴⁵ It then is to call others to Christ, to recognize Christ in them and, above all else, to never transform the gospel of the sinner into a commendation of sin or a justification of the wicked. Is that last point not exactly what both the Liberal West and Global South are guilty of in terms of our present dialogue? Is it not a denial of Christ in another, the refusal to acknowledge our own sinful participations in structures that are anti-Christ and an obsession with sin, or sexual sin, that has stopped our ears and occluded our faculties from humbling ourselves to the

will of God? Is it that we expect *not* to prove God's will because in the place of God within us is an idol that each holds dear?

For Bonhoeffer, the place of responsibility for the Christian in vocation as sinner is to heed the one who calls. It is neither what Bonhoeffer so acutely notes as the secular Protestant virtue of loyal discharge of human mandates of good citizen, spouse-parent, labourer and church attendance nor the monastic or Augustinian 'struggle' against the world.⁴⁶ It is a simple responsibility towards Jesus Christ and in witness to this idea Bonhoeffer calls one master of suspicion in Nietzsche and his criticism of mere philosophical inclusion:

You are assiduous in your attentions to your neighbor and you find beautiful words to describe your assiduity. But I tell you that you love for neighbor is a worthless love for yourselves. You go to your neighbor to seek refuge for yourselves and then you try to make a virtue of it, but I see through your 'unselfishness'.⁴⁷

Here Bonhoeffer crystallizes love for theological anthropology. Love is not mere inclusion, for that can work as an idol in which we cement our commitment to ourselves or another power which enthralls us such as the market, but instead he notes is, as in the case of God, to love whoever is furthestest for us. As sinners, we know that we who were far are brought near, and we, who we unlovely, were loved because of God in Christ. That is the human story because it is God's story.

What does this mean then? There are several points germane to our discussion within the Anglican Communion. Not only should we *expect* to prove God's will, as argued above, but perhaps the way forward in this is to no longer love only ourselves or our near neighbors on both sides but rather to love, rooted deeply in vocation, those 'furthestest' from us. This is persistent service to the furthestest from us, a wrestling until a blessing is secured and God's will proved. But it is also that the dialogue be shifted from a debate of theological sexuality to theological identity, of which one aspect is sexuality but not the dominant dialogical point. Perhaps, and here I speak anecdotally, if mission say in terms of HIV/AIDS and economic colonialism were more prominent in our dialogue with the Global South, as was the hope itself of most of the Southern Bishops at Lambeth 1998,⁴⁸ than perhaps virulence might recede just a little. We need more theological anthropology, a recovery of Christian thought that uses the categories of the tradition and roots identity in the human story as revealed in God's story rather than an account of human identity derived from a local history of the market and our fetishism in asserting mastery therein.

Finally I wish to address the two documents our conference is dedicated towards in passing. In reference to *The Windsor Report* I commend it wholeheartedly, and as I have written and published on, in terms of its assumption that Scripture is foundational to 'proving the will of God' and that this in turn refutes much of what constitutes contemporary theology and biblical studies so that it may be once again possible to speak of a homology between Christ preached and risen and ascended.⁴⁹ Its only difficulty, I

maintain, is its reception theology borrowed from a Catholic tradition that chaffs against this Protestant centrality of Scripture, proclamation and the ‘making present of Christ’ (*Vergegenwärtigung*). In reference to *The St Michael’s Report* we have a much more problematic document that may be fundamentally dishonest although its conclusions are largely warranted in terms of marriage as doctrine for the simple fact that no human institution is without reference to Christ. The dominant problem I have with our Canadian report is its failure to do theology and its continual hesitation to denounce cultural or social factors in coming to begin theological work. It follows the motifs of *Dogmengeschichte* and inclusive [ecclesio]-Christology all too well and in doing so has introduced a three-fold doctrinal distinction of core, adiaphoric and something else. The ‘something else’ I think is largely due to the presence of social theologies and anthropologies.

My prescription:

What do I suggest then for both sides of the dialogue?

1. Both need to be honest in recognizing that the discussion is in part, if not substantially, framed by an idolatrous presupposition inherited, framed and driven by a contingent historical phenomenon and reinforced by biopower as expressed in post-colonial jitters and response. The way forward, I propose, is a vocation of love in which mammon is exposed for what it is and our complicity in its propagation is repented.
2. Both need to abandon theologies which are embodied in the sense argued above and instead begin the process of articulating a new (old) theological anthropology derived from Christology, and this also may be a rejection of some aspects of present biblical work.
3. Both need to love the other, be committed to them in ways that are uncomfortable, costly and imperative in order to prove God’s will, and find God-in-the-Other. This, perhaps, is the most important aspect for it will found point two and refute point one.

¹ Micheal Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction* (trans R Hurley), (New York, Vintage Books, 1990) p 155. Emphasis mine and parenthesis altered for clarity of compound sentence.

² Foucault, 98.

³ See, for example, Immanuel Wallenstein, *The Modern World System I and II*, (New York: Academic Press, 1974 and 1980); *After Liberalism* (New York: Academic Press, 1995).

⁴ Foucault 135-59. Foucault’s argument is that the materialist shift in sexuality, derived to maximize production, meant that the *raison d’être* of sexuality became not the awakening of humanitarian feelings, but to reinforce production. This, he thinks, replaces death consideration that death was the end of human power, therefore most important question to death being managed and thereby neutering the most important question of human existence. In a very real sense, death by being managed created a new force of interpretation of human existence in ‘biopower’ as such biopower he argues becomes ‘the agent of transformation of human life’ (p 143).

⁵ Foucault 7.

⁶ Michael Allen Williams, *Rethinking Gnosticism: An Argument for Disabling a Dubious Category* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I,76.

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- ⁸ Foucault 67.
- ⁹ Foucault 56 and 69.
- ¹⁰ See, for example, Hugh B Urban, *Magia Sexualis: Sex, Magic and Liberation in modern Esotericism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).
- ¹¹ Foucault 59.
- ¹² Foucault 42-47.
- ¹³ Most famously in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (trans. C Smith) (London: Routledge, 1981).
- ¹⁴ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (trans. A. Lingis) (Boston: Kluwer, 1979) and famously *Alterity and Transcendence* (trans. M Smith), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
- ¹⁵ William Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),
- ¹⁶ Richard Kearney, 'Transfiguring God', in (ed.) Graham Ward, *Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology*, p 384.
- ¹⁷ Stanley Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith* (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2004) pp 13-30.
- ¹⁸ John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005) pp 288.
- ¹⁹ Don Cupitt, 'Anti-discrimination' in (ed.) Ward, 488.
- ²⁰ See, for example, Mary Prokes, *Towards a Theology of the Body*, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996) and earlier Joan Timmerman, *Sexuality and Spiritual Growth* (New York: Crossroads, 1993).
- ²¹ Hans Ur von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory*, vol 1-5 (trans. G Harrison) (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988-98), especially volume two 'Man in God'.
- ²² Tina Beattie, 'Carnal Love and Spiritual Imagination: Can Irigaray and John Paul II Come Together', *Essays in Theology, Sexuality and Society* (eds) John Davies and Gerard Loughlin (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997) pp 160-83.
- ²³ For a positive view of this, see Don Cupitt, *Mysticism after Modernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
- ²⁴ Foucault 35.
- ²⁵ See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).
- ²⁶ See, on the need for management as a theme in modernity, Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, (trans. M Ritter) (London: Sage, 2005).
- ²⁷ Foucault pp 24-25.
- ²⁸ C J Dean, 'The Productive Hypothesis: Foucault, Gender and the History of Sexuality', *History and Theory* 33 (1994), pp 271-96.
- ²⁹ Foucault 47.
- ³⁰ Foucault 47.
- ³¹ See essays in T Carver and V Mottier (eds), *Politics of Sexuality: Identity, Gender and Citizenship* (London: Routledge, 1998).
- ³² See, on Foucault's import on this issue, D Halperin, 'Forgetting Foucault: Acts, Identities and the History of Sexuality', *Representations* 63 (1998), 63-120.
- ³³ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, (trans. N Smith) (ed. E Bethage) (London: SCM, 1960) 182.
- ³⁴ On this point, see my response to James Cone: Darren C Marks, 'The Foundation for Christomorphic Metanoia in James H Cone and Dietrich Bonhoeffer', *Union Seminary Theological Quarterly* 60:1-2 (2006), pp 39-58.
- ³⁵ Bonhoeffer 9.
- ³⁶ Bonhoeffer 22.
- ³⁷ Bonhoeffer 8.
- ³⁸ Bonhoeffer 16.
- ³⁹ Bonhoeffer 19.
- ⁴⁰ Bonhoeffer 57.
- ⁴¹ Bonhoeffer makes an interesting argument on the orders of creation or mandates of labour, marriage, government and Church. In each of these, it is not a natural right per se that is espoused but how each of these human socialities functions in order to evoke the 'law of love' of witness to God's grace. As such, for example, in marriage it is not procreation or divine institution of sexual production that is important but rather how in the issue (or restriction thereof) of children or spousal relationship one points to the reality of God in the life of the other. Thus, Bonhoeffer concludes that marriage is a contract between two persons to

uphold certain ‘rights’ namely protection of life but that the foundation of those rights is that all life is sacred to God because of Jesus Christ in whom God bonds to created life. Bonhoeffer 73-131.

⁴² Bonhoeffer 61.

⁴³ Bonhoeffer 164.

⁴⁴ Bonhoeffer 165.

⁴⁵ Bonhoeffer 174.

⁴⁶ Bonhoeffer 222-25.

⁴⁷ Bonhoeffer 227.

⁴⁸ See, on this point and the reversal of the concerns of Lambeth 1998, Robin Gill, *Changing Worlds: Can the Church Respond?* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002) pp 34-69.

⁴⁹ See, Darren C Marks, ‘The Windsor Report: A Theological Commentary’, *Journal of Anglican Studies* 4(2) (2006), pp 157-76. Bonhoeffer picks up a similar theme. Bonhoeffer 258-65.